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1. INTRODUCTION 
An initial public offering (IPO) entails great uncertainty (Filatotchev et al., 2016). Hence, IPO 
companies may seek certification from third-parties — such as venture capital (VC) firms — 
to reduce uncertainty and improve their IPO value (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). However, not 
all VC firms are the same. An important distinction is between domestic and foreign VC firms. 
Foreign VC firms have their headquarters in countries other than the ones of their portfolio 
companies, and they may therefore suffer from a liability of foreignness and high adverse 
selection (Wright et al., 2005; Devigne et al., 2016), which could be mitigated by foreign VC 
firms forming syndicates with domestic VC firms (Cumming & Dai, 2010). Nevertheless, as 
sophisticated investors, foreign VC firms may provide their portfolio companies with new 
skills, knowledge and resources (Meuleman et al., 2017). As such, their joint presence with 
domestic VC firms in the VC syndicate is likely to certify the quality of the IPO firm. Further, 
foreign VC firms may provide advice on the foreign business activities of their portfolio 
companies as well as monitor these activities. Prior literature has focused on how cross-border 
VC syndicates assist their portfolio companies in their growth and internationalization 
(Devigne et al., 2013; Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013a, Chemmanur et al., 2016). Yet, we 
know little about how foreign VC firms support their portfolio companies internationally, and 
affect their value at the IPO. This study fills this gap by attempting to answer the following 
research questions. First, what are the effects on IPO value of the involvement of both foreign 
VC firms, i.e. non-US VC firms, and domestic US VC firms, in the VC syndicate of US IPO 
companies?1 Second, is there an impact of foreign VC firms on the association between foreign 
business activities and IPO value for US IPO companies?  
                                                          
1 We define the VC syndicate as the group of all VC investors in the venture immediately prior to the IPO. 
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As the IPO company and the underwriter embark on setting the offer price, they receive 
feedback from investors during the roadshows they conduct. Accordingly, the premium paid 
by investors above and beyond the pre-IPO book value per share reflects their perception of 
the future value of the company and its earnings potential (Lester et al., 2006).2 The IPO 
premium represents the excess of a company’s offer price compared to its book value and hence 
captures the present value of growth opportunities embedded in the offer price (Welbourne & 
Andrews, 1996).3 It reflects the company’s assets and provides an estimate of investors’ 
perceived future value and a “sense of their (the market) perceptions of a firm’s 
competitiveness” (Bell et al., 2014, p. 308). Importantly, the IPO premium allows for measuring 
assets that “are difficult to account for” (Nelson, 2003, p. 715), such as foreign assets.  
We hypothesize that foreign VC firms play three roles around the time of the IPO. First, VC 
firms — whether domestic or foreign — play a certification role stemming from their superior 
capabilities of valuing IPO companies (Stuart et al., 1999). We expect the joint involvement of 
foreign and domestic VC firms in the VC syndicate to signal the quality of the portfolio 
company and to certify its value at the time of the IPO. Second, foreign VC firms may play an 
advisory role in their portfolio companies. Foreign VC firms have the skills, the knowledge, 
and the networks to advise their portfolio companies on how to develop their foreign business 
activities, thus increasing IPO value. Third, foreign VC firms may play a monitoring role, 
whereby they may act as monitors of ventures’ foreign business activities in their country of 
origin.  
To test the validity of our hypotheses on how the three roles of foreign VC firms affect IPO 
value, we study a sample of 1,086 VC-backed US IPOs from 1995 to 2011. Our paper makes 
                                                          
2 See Certo et al. (2009) for a discussion about the different performance measures used in the IPO literature. 
3 The book value might not represent the true value of VC-backed entrepreneurial firms as they may have positive 
cash-flows, but negative earnings before they go public. This might then result in a negative book value. 
Nevertheless, none of our sample IPO companies has a negative book value before the IPO. 
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three important contributions to the existing literature. First, it complements prior evidence on 
the certification role played by VC firms in general (Megginson & Weiss, 1991), and the joint 
role played by foreign and domestic VC firms within the VC syndicate in particular (Devigne 
et al., 2013; Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014; Chemmanur et al., 2016). We hypothesize that a VC 
syndicate composed of both domestic (US) and foreign (non-US) VC firms is better able to 
certify the quality of its US portfolio company than a syndicate with only US or non-US VC 
firms; this in turn leads to a higher IPO premium. We find empirical support for this hypothesis. 
Second, this paper sheds light on the advisory and monitoring roles played by foreign VC firms 
investing in US IPO companies, thereby extending the existing literature on value added by 
foreign VC firms (Nahata et al., 2014; Chemmanur et al., 2016). By accounting for the origin 
of foreign VC firms and the countries where the IPO company has foreign business activities, 
our research complements previous studies, which attempt to disentangle the different roles 
played by VC firms in advising and monitoring their portfolio companies (Hellmann & Puri, 
2002). We argue that foreign VC firms are likely to bridge the liability of foreignness of their 
portfolio companies, while domestic VC firms bring knowledge of the US business 
environment and market. We expect foreign VC firms to provide advice on the foreign business 
activities of their investees and monitor these activities, thus enhancing value creation. The 
results support our hypothesis. 
Finally, our paper contributes to previous literature on investor home bias (e.g. Cumming & 
Dai, 2010), and recent empirical findings on the difficulties of attracting VC investors to 
participate in the syndicates of new US ventures looking to develop internationally (LiPuma & 
Park, 2013). We add to this stream of literature and show how foreign VC firms affect the 
association between foreign business activities and IPO value. Understanding the roles of 
foreign VC firms has policy relevance. Indeed, studying these roles provides further insights 
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into the relationships between the strategic goals set for portfolio companies and the 
composition of their VC syndicate. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data sources, sample, and methodology. 
Section 4 focuses on the empirical results and Section 5 conducts further investigations. 
Finally, Section 6 discusses the practical relevance of our results, the limitations of the study 
and concludes by suggesting possible avenues for future research. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. The certification role of foreign VC firms 
As professional investors, foreign VC firms are likely to perform a thorough preliminary risk 
assessment, and due diligence of the information available for valuation (Karsai et al., 1998). 
In particular, the cultural distance between foreign VC firms and their portfolio companies may 
make the former more cautious than domestic VC firms in their selection choices, and create 
incentives for better screening of their portfolio companies (Nahata et al., 2014). The 
involvement of foreign VC firms within the VC syndicate may thus constitute a positive signal 
about the portfolio company, thereby certifying its quality to IPO investors (Karsai et al., 1998). 
However, despite the recent growth in cross-border VC investment, VC firms may suffer from 
a liability of foreignness given their lack of local market knowledge as well as their lack of 
access to local networks, and local resources (Zaheer, 1995). Foreign VC firms are often 
unfamiliar with local markets due to their limited direct experience, thus suffering from low 
trust with local networks (Ahlstrom et al., 2007).  
In contrast, domestic VC firms are likely to complement foreign VC firms by counterbalancing 
their weaknesses. Indeed, compared to foreign VC firms, domestic VC firms have better 
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knowledge of the local market and the quality of investment opportunities provided by local 
portfolio companies. The liability of foreignness of foreign VC firms could thus be mitigated 
by having a VC syndicate composed of both foreign and domestic VC firms (Cumming & Dai, 
2010). In support of this argument, foreign VC deal syndication with local partners has been 
found to reduce risk, facilitate the due diligence process, improve venture outcome, and assist 
in the monitoring of the portfolio company (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Further, Humphery-
Jenner & Suchard (2013b) study the effect of foreign VC firms on Chinese IPO companies, 
and find that the likelihood of success of an IPO company increases if the foreign VC firm 
collaborates with a local partner. Moreover, VC syndicates composed of both foreign and 
domestic VC firms have a greater positive effect on post-IPO operating performance than VC 
syndicates composed of purely foreign or purely local VC firms (Chemmanur et al., 2016). 
Close and direct connections between domestic and foreign VC firms thus have a certification 
effect, which facilitates quality assessment of both domestic and foreign business activities 
(Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014).  
Hence, compared to a VC syndicate, which consists of purely foreign or local VC firms, a VC 
syndicate composed of both foreign and domestic VC firms is likely to provide greater 
certification of the IPO value:  
Hypothesis (1): The IPO premium is greater for IPO companies with a VC syndicate with both 
foreign and domestic VC firms. 
2.2. The advisory role of foreign VC firms 
When growing internationally and developing their business beyond their domestic borders, 
new ventures suffer from a liability of foreignness that could be reduced by foreign VC firms 
(Maula et al., 2005; Devigne et al., 2013). Foreign business activities offer several advantages 
(Zahra et al., 2000), but they are also risky as they expose companies to more varying political, 
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economic, social, and technological environments. These risks are more pronounced for 
companies with limited funding that have to tap into new sources of capital through an IPO 
(LiPuma, 2012). Hence, foreign business activities may have a positive or negative effect on 
IPO value.  
Given this liability of foreignness that could limit their international growth (Devigne et al., 
2013), new ventures may benefit from the knowledge, the advice, and the resources provided 
by VC firms (Schertler & Tykvova, 2011). Compared to domestic VC firms, foreign VC firms 
are more familiar with foreign markets. They also have the incentives to supply such strategic 
and operational advice to increase the likelihood of success of their portfolio companies 
(Barney et al., 1996).  
More specifically, foreign VC firms may provide advice on the human, social, and physical 
capital that enables IPO companies to develop their foreign business activities in a more 
efficient and effective manner. They may also provide their IPO companies with other 
intangible resources, such as private knowledge and experience about foreign markets and 
foreign legal requirements (Mäkelä & Maula, 2006). To sum up, foreign VC firms may offer 
their IPO companies access to their networks in foreign markets, which could help them recruit 
personnel, identify customers, build business partnerships, and access financiers (Mäkelä & 
Maula, 2006; Hursti & Maula, 2007). Foreign VC firms may thus positively affect the 
competitive advantage and the performance of an IPO company (Devigne et al., 2013).  
Based on the above literature, foreign VC firms are likely to support the international growth 
of their portfolio companies. Through their presence in the IPO companies, foreign VC firms 
may play an advisory role in their IPO companies engaged in foreign business activities. 
Investors may thus be willing to pay a greater premium for IPO companies with foreign 
business activities that have foreign VC backing. Hence: 
8 
 
Hypothesis (2): The interaction between foreign VC presence and foreign business activities 
has a positive effect on the IPO premium. 
2.3. The monitoring role of foreign VC firms 
Following their investment, we expect VC firms to monitor their portfolio companies through 
frequent visits to their IPO companies’ operational sites (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Bernstein 
et al. (2016) use a natural experiment to examine the direct effect of VC involvement and 
monitoring on the performance of their portfolio companies. Following the introduction of new 
airline routes that reduce the travel time between the VC firms and their portfolio companies, 
the authors find a greater probability of a successful exit through an IPO or an acquisition.  
In what precedes, we assumed differences in knowledge between domestic VC firms and 
foreign VC firms: Domestic VC firms have better knowledge of the domestic market and 
institutions whereas foreign VC firms have better knowledge of foreign markets and 
institutions. What then matters is the proximity of foreign VC firms to the foreign operations 
of their portfolio companies as this would allow them to monitor their portfolio companies at 
a lower cost. Indeed, such proximity would enable foreign VC firms to visit foreign plants 
located in their countries more easily, as well as read business reports and review operations 
without significant loss of time. In other words, such proximity would reduce the agency costs 
and ultimately improve performance (Giroud, 2013; Coval & Moskowitz, 1999, 2001). 
Domestic VC firms may thus rely on foreign VC firms to monitor the foreign business activities 
in the home countries of the foreign VC firms, as they better understand the cultural and 
institutional conditions. Based on the above, we hypothesize that foreign VC firms that 
originate from the same countries where the IPO company has foreign business activities will 
be better able to monitor such foreign business activities, thus increasing the IPO premium. 
Hence: 
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Hypothesis (3): The interaction between foreign VC presence and foreign business activities 
has a greater positive effect on the IPO premium if the foreign VC firms are from the same 
countries where the IPO company has foreign business activities. 
Figure 1 depicts our theoretical model, and refers to our three hypotheses. First, it exhibits the 
positive effect of a VC syndicate including both foreign and domestic VC firms on the IPO 
premium (Hypothesis (1)). Second, it illustrates that the interaction between foreign VC firms 
and foreign business activities positively impacts the IPO premium (Hypothesis (2)). Finally, 
it explains that, when the headquarters of at least one of the foreign VC firms are located in the 
same country where the IPO company has foreign business activities, this positively affects the 
IPO premium (Hypothesis (3)). 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
3. DATA SOURCES, SAMPLE, AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data sources and sample 
Our sample is drawn from the entire population of 6,009 IPO companies in the US markets 
completed between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2011 as obtained from the Global New 
Issues database of Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC). In line with prior IPO 
literature, we first exclude all ADRs, REITs, unit offerings, carve-outs and spinoffs, closed-
end funds, foreign IPOs, and IPOs with an offer price below USD 5.4 There are 2,294 such 
IPOs. This results in 1,805 VC-backed IPOs after excluding 1,910 non-VC-backed IPOs. We 
then match the VC-backed IPOs with the list of companies in the VentureXpert database, and 
we exclude 445 VC-backed IPOs with incomplete data on the VC syndicate. We also exclude 
                                                          
4 We exclude IPOs with an offer price below $5, so called penny stocks. Such stocks are usually excluded as they 
do not qualify for listing on the NASDAQ, AMEX, and the NYSE exchanges (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
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85 companies not covered by Datastream. We then match the remaining 1,275 VC-backed 
IPOs with data from both the Deals module of the Thomson One Banker database and 
Datastream. We then exclude 189 VC-backed IPOs with missing data on firm characteristics 
and CEO origin. The latter is collected from their biography on the CEOs’ company’s website, 
the IPO prospectus, and via the CEOs’ LinkedIn accounts. The final sample includes 1,086 
VC-backed IPOs. Since our unit of analysis is the VC-backed IPO company and since our 
paper studies the certification, the advisory and monitoring roles played by foreign VC firms 
in IPO companies, we run our empirical tests on the 1,086 VC-backed IPOs.5  
Although not tabulated, we investigate the sample’s representativeness of the entire population 
of US VC-backed IPO companies. We compare the distribution across IPO years, and across 
industries using the one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for the population of 
1,805 VC-backed IPO companies to those for the sample of 1,086 VC-backed IPO companies 
and the subsample of foreign VC-backed IPO companies. The tests for the difference in 
proportions confirm that the sample’s distribution across IPO years and industries is similar to 
that of the overall population. Finally, there are also no significant differences in the average 
age, the average market capitalization, and the proportion of IPO companies in the hi-tech 
sector between the sample of 1,086 VC-backed IPO companies and the entire population of 
VC-backed IPO companies.  
                                                          
5 We first match the list of IPO companies in the Deals module of Thomson One Banker with the list of companies 
in the VentureXpert database based on the company name and the six-digit Committee on Uniform Securities 
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number. To collect data from Datastream, we then use the International 
Securities Identification Number (ISIN), the unique company identifier used by Datastream. Since the ISIN is 
only available for a very small number of companies contained in the Deals module we manually look up all of 
the remaining companies in Datastream to get their ISIN. 
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3.2. Methodology 
In line with prior literature, we use the IPO premium, i.e. the difference between the offer price 
and the pre-IPO book value per share expressed as a fraction of the offer price (Rasheed et al., 
1997; Nelson, 2003), as a measure of investors’ IPO valuation. Prior research uses three proxies 
for internationalization: foreign sales to total sales, foreign assets to total assets (Blonigen & 
Wooster, 2003; LiPuma 2012), and foreign net income to total net income (Kotabe et al., 2002). 
Data for all three proxies is collected from Datastream for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Our 
paper focuses on the foreign sales to total sales measure, for which we have the greatest number 
of observations. Untabulated robustness tests using foreign assets and foreign income confirm 
our results.  
We consider a VC firm to be foreign if its country of incorporation is not the USA as per 
VentureXpert, Pratt VC Guidebook, and the VC firm’s website. To examine the effect of the 
foreignness of the VC syndicate, we use two different variables to measure the presence of 
foreign VC firms, which are: (1) Proportion of Foreign VCs, which is the number of foreign 
VC firms divided by the number of VC firms in the IPO company’s VC syndicate, and (2) 
Foreign VC Ownership, which is the number of shares owned by foreign VC firms divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding, both measured immediately prior to the IPO.  
An important methodological issue this paper faces stems from the three roles we argue that 
foreign VC firms assume. These are their certification role (Hypothesis (1)), their advisory role 
(Hypothesis (2)) and their monitoring role (Hypothesis (3)) (see also Figure 1). Hence, we 
expect that foreign VC firms i) select US ventures with existing or potential foreign business 
activities as they have a competitive advantage in certifying such activities, and ii) provide 
relevant advice and iii) monitor the foreign business activities of their US portfolio companies. 
One of the limitations of our study is that the data does not permit us to identify what occurred 
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first, i.e. the foreign VC backing or the foreign business activities. Hence, the direction of 
causality between foreign business activities and the involvement of foreign VC firms is not 
clear. Nevertheless, three-stage least-squares (3SLS) regression analysis enables us to adjust 
for foreign VC firms selecting US IPO companies with existing foreign business activities as 
well as foreign VC firms supporting the internationalization of their US portfolio companies.6 
Thus, we estimate the following 3SLS regressions. Equation (1) is our main equation, 
explaining the IPO premium whereas equations (2) and (3) control for the endogenous 
determination of both the foreignness of the VC syndicate and foreign business activities 
(proxied by the proportion of foreign sales), respectively, which in turn affect the IPO value:  
IPO Premium = α0 + α1 Foreign and Domestic VC dummy + α2 Foreign Business Activities + 
α3 Foreign VC Presence + α4 Foreign Business Activities x Foreign VC Presence + Control 
variables + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ξ (1)  
Foreign VC Presence = β0 + β1 Foreign Business Activities + β2 Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC 
Syndicate Relationship dummy + Instrumental variables + Control variables + Industry 
dummies + Year dummies + ε  (2) 
Foreign Business Activities = γ0 + γ1 Foreign VC Presence + Instrumental variable + Control 
variables + Industry dummies + Year dummies + µ (3) 
Where, equation (1) tests the validity of Hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) on IPO value, which is 
measured by IPO Premium. Specifically, we test the validity of the first hypothesis on the 
certification role of domestic and foreign VC firms by using Foreign and Domestic VC dummy, 
which is equal to one if the VC syndicate is composed of both foreign and domestic VC firms, 
                                                          
6 We find evidence of both. Also, in an earlier version of this paper, we used a simultaneous system controlling 
for the endogenous determination of foreign business activities only (current equation (3)), and the key results 
remain the same. 
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and zero otherwise. The validity of Hypothesis (2) on the advisory role of foreign VC firms is 
tested via the interaction term between the foreignness of the VC syndicate, i.e. foreign VC 
presence, and foreign business activities, i.e. the proportion of foreign sales. We expect the 
coefficient on this interaction term to be positive (see Figure 1). The validity of Hypothesis (3) 
is tested via subsample analysis where we distinguish between IPO companies with foreign 
business activities in at least one of the VC countries of origin and those without such foreign 
business activities. We expect the coefficient on the interaction between foreign VC presence 
and foreign business activities to be positive for the former subsample, and we expect it to be 
significantly higher than the one in the latter subsample. 
Equation (2) explains the foreignness of the VC syndicate (Foreign VC Presence), proxied by 
the two alternative measures of foreign VC presence (the proportion of foreign VC firms in the 
VC syndicate, and foreign VC ownership). The equation includes Same Foreign VC-CEO 
Origin and Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC Syndicate Relationship dummy as instrumental 
variables (IVs). The first IV is a dummy variable equaling one if the CEO has the same national 
origin as at least one of the foreign VC firms in the syndicate, and zero otherwise. The second 
IV is also a dummy variable. It equals one if any of the foreign VC firms has co-invested in a 
prior IPO company with any other member of the VC syndicate, and zero otherwise. Prior 
research suggests that ethnic origin and shared socio-cultural backgrounds represent important 
attributes, which are likely to create a trusting relationship between individuals (Marsden, 
1988). We thus expect foreign CEOs to attract foreign VC firms from their country of origin, 
which increases the foreignness of the VC syndicate. Prior research also suggests that IPO 
investors prefer to invest with other investors, with whom they have a pre-existing relationship 
through prior syndication (Meuleman et al., 2009). As such, we expect the foreignness of the 
VC syndicate to increase if foreign VC firms have prior syndication experience with any of the 
VC syndicate members.  
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The third regression, equation (3), explains the magnitude of foreign business activities, 
measured by foreign sales as a proportion of total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. This 
regression uses Foreign CEO dummy as an IV. This variable is equal to one if the CEO of the 
IPO company at the time of the IPO was not born in the USA, and zero otherwise. This is in 
line with prior research suggesting that US companies that switch from US CEOs to foreign 
CEOs experience an increase in their foreign assets and foreign sales (Blonigen & Wooster, 
2003), as well as an increase in their exporting activities (Sala & Yalcin, 2014).  
We use the following control variables. We use VC firms’ reputation as more reputable VC 
firms are likely to get more involved in their portfolio companies and support their growth, 
which ultimately improves the performance of the IPO companies (Chahine & Goergen, 2011). 
Foreign (Domestic) VC Reputation is equal to the total number of previous US IPOs with which 
all of the IPO company’s foreign (domestic) VC firms were involved during the five years prior 
to the IPO. We also use Same Foreign CVC-IPO Company Industry. This is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the VC syndicate includes a foreign corporate VC, whose parent company 
operates in the same industry (based on the one-digit SIC) as the IPO company, and zero 
otherwise. A foreign corporate VC firm operating in the same industry as the portfolio company 
is more likely to contribute to the international growth of the portfolio company given that the 
latter has a strategic fit with the parent of the corporate VC firm (Ivanov & Xie, 2010). 
In addition, we use a set of control variables that prior literature identifies as determinants of 
the IPO premium. These include IPO company size, measured by Market Capitalization, i.e. 
the total number of shares outstanding immediately after the IPO times the offer price (Beatty 
& Ritter, 1986), and Company Age, i.e. the difference, in years, between the IPO date and the 
company’s incorporation date (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Both variables are expected to be 
negatively associated with the IPO premium. Additionally, high-technology companies have 
greater potential for growth (Chahine & Goergen, 2013). Hence, we include Hi-tech dummy, 
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which equals one if the IPO company is a hi-tech company, and zero otherwise. We expect it 
to positively affect the IPO premium. We also include Number of Risk Factors, which is the 
number of risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus, which might negatively affect the IPO 
company’s valuation (Cyr et al., 2000). The presence of a founder CEO was found to positively 
affect the IPO premium (Nelson, 2003). Hence, we include Founder CEO, a dummy variable, 
which is equal to one if the IPO company’s CEO is a founder, and zero otherwise. IPOs with a 
greater equity offer ratio are likely to be priced lower (Shleifer, 1986). Equity Offer Ratio is 
defined as the number of shares issued in the IPO divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding immediately after the IPO, and we expect it to be negatively associated with the 
IPO premium. 
In line with prior research (Filatotchev et al., 2016), we use Loss dummy Y-1 and Loss dummy 
Y-2 to control for prior performance. The former and the latter take the value of one if the 
company has a negative ROA in year -1 and year -2 prior to the IPO year, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. We use VC Syndicate to control for the size of the VC syndicate, i.e. the number 
of VC firms investing in the IPO company immediately prior to the offering, and we expect it 
to increase IPO value (Tian, 2012). We use NASDAQ dummy as there exist significant 
differences in IPO valuations between NASDAQ and the other exchanges (Lowry et al., 2010). 
The length of the lock-up period has been suggested as a signal of the IPO company’s quality 
(Bruton et al., 2010). We expect it to positively affect the IPO premium. Lock-up Period is the 
difference, in days, between the IPO date and the lock-up expiry date (Chahine & Goergen, 
2011). Underwriter reputation is also an important signal, as reputable underwriters certify the 
quality of the issuing companies, reflected in a greater IPO premium. Underwriter reputation 
is based on the ranking by Loughran & Ritter (2004), which uses a scale of zero to nine, ranging 
from the least to the most prestigious underwriter. We also use Bubble dummy, which equals 
one if the IPO was in 1999-2000, and zero otherwise. This period is characterized by greater 
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availability of capital as well as higher valuation multiples, thus leading to a positive 
association between the IPO premium and the bubble dummy (Chahine & Goergen, 2011). 
We also control for the momentum effect: Market Return, the pre-IPO market return, which is 
positively associated with IPO value. In line with Chahine & Goergen (2011), Market Return 
is the weighted average of the daily returns on the CRSP equally weighted portfolio over the 
three months preceding the IPO date, where the average daily return for the third month 
preceding the IPO date is given a weight of 1, the average daily return for the second month a 
weight of 2, and that for the first month prior to the IPO date a weight of 3. Finally, we control 
for differences across industries via two-digit SIC codes and differences across time via IPO 
year dummies. The equations measuring foreign VC presence by foreign VC ownership further 
control for domestic VC ownership. The definitions of the variables are listed in the Appendix. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We start by discussing descriptive statistics. We then analyze the associations between the IPO 
premium, foreign business activities, and foreign VC firms as stated in our hypotheses.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample, i.e. the mean, median, and standard 
deviation. Panel A focuses on the IPO company characteristics. Panel B reports descriptive 
statistics for the VC characteristics for both our sample of 1,086 VC-backed IPOs and the 
subsample of 314 VC-backed IPOs, which involve foreign VC firms. Although not tabulated, 
foreign VC firms originate mostly from Europe (49.43%) and South-East Asia (36.05%). More 
specifically, they come from the UK (20.4%), Japan (14.96%), and Canada (12.24%).  
The sample of VC-backed IPOs in Panel A has an average (median) IPO premium of 73.4% 
(74.4%). The average proportion of foreign sales (Proportion Foreign Sales) is 0.110. The 
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descriptive statistics for the remaining IPO company characteristics are in line with the existing 
IPO literature. It is noteworthy that 25% of IPO companies have a foreign CEO (Foreign CEO 
dummy), and 3.4% of CEOs originate from the same country as at least one of the foreign VC 
firms in the syndicate (Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin).  
Insert Table 1 Here 
Panel B first reports the characteristics of the VC firms involved in the sample of VC-backed 
IPOs. The VC syndicate (VC Syndicate) comprises about four VC firms on average. The 
average proportion of foreign VC firms (Proportion of Foreign VCs) and domestic VC firms 
(Proportion of Domestic VCs), i.e. the number of foreign VC firms and that of domestic VC 
firms divided by the total number of VC firms in the VC syndicate, is 0.098 and 0.902, 
respectively. Foreign VC firms (Foreign VC Ownership) and domestic VC firms (Domestic 
VC Ownership) own on average 3.8% and 36.5% of the shares outstanding immediately prior 
to the IPO, respectively. Moreover, VC syndicates involving both foreign and domestic VC 
firms represent 26.7% of the VC-backed sample. Finally, 15.7% of IPO companies have 
foreign business activities in the same country as the country of origin of at least one of their 
foreign VC firms (Same VC-Foreign Business Country). The remainder of Panel B presents 
descriptive statistics for the VC characteristics for the subsample of 314 VC-backed IPOs 
involving foreign VC firms. We find a larger VC syndicate than for the sample of all VC-
backed IPOs, with around six VC firms on average rather than just four. Foreign VC firms 
represent 33.7% of the VC syndicate, and they own an average 13.2% of shares outstanding 
prior to the IPO date.  
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. Our instruments in equations (2) and (3) are valid: 
Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin and Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC Syndicate Relationship 
dummy are correlated with each of the two measures of foreign VC presence. However, they 
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are not correlated with the proportion of foreign sales nor the IPO premium. Moreover, Foreign 
CEO dummy is correlated with Foreign Business Activities, but it is not correlated with any of 
the two measures of the foreignness of the VC syndicate nor the IPO premium. None of the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) is greater than 2.72, which suggests that there is no severe 
multicollinearity. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
4.2. The IPO premium, the foreignness of the VC syndicate, and foreign business activities  
Table 3 examines the effects of the foreignness of the VC syndicate and foreign business 
activities on the IPO premium. It is based on the 3SLS model developed in Section 3.2. 
Regressions (1a) and (1b) test the validity of Hypothesis (1) by examining the effect on the 
IPO premium of a VC syndicate composed of both foreign and domestic VC firms. They also 
test the validity of Hypothesis (2) by examining the effect on the IPO premium of the 
interaction of the foreignness of the VC syndicate with foreign business activities. Regressions 
(2a) and (2b) explain the foreignness of the VC syndicate, whereas regressions (3a) and (3b) 
explain foreign business activities (measured by foreign sales as a proportion of total sales). 
Again, the latter two sets of regressions control for the endogenous determination of the 
foreignness of the VC syndicate (equation (2)) and foreign business activities (equation (3)).  
The various regressions, designated by the letters a and b, use two different proxies for foreign 
(domestic7) VC presence. Foreign VC presence is measured by the proportion of foreign VC 
firms in the VC syndicate in regressions (1a), (2a), and (3a),8 and foreign VC ownership in 
regressions (1b), (2b), and (3b).  
Insert Table 3 Here 
                                                          
7 Where applicable. 
8 The proportion of domestic VC firms is omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
19 
 
Regressions (1a) and (1b) suggest that the IPO premium increases with the presence of a VC 
syndicate with both domestic and foreign firms (p=5%), thus providing support for Hypothesis 
(1). They also suggest that foreign business activities, as measured by the proportion of foreign 
sales, positively affect the IPO premium (p=5% or better). Importantly, these regressions also 
indicate that the IPO premium is not positively related to foreign VC presence.9 However, this 
does not preclude an indirect positive effect as per Hypothesis (2). Indeed, regressions (1a) and 
(1b) confirm the positive effect on the IPO premium of the interaction between foreign VC 
presence and the proportion of foreign sales. There is such a positive effect for both measures 
of the foreignness of the VC syndicate, specifically the proportion of foreign VC firms (p=5%), 
and foreign VC ownership (p=1%). A 10% increase in the interaction between foreign business 
activities and Foreign VC Presence increases the IPO premium by 8.64 to 13.01 percentage 
points. Hence, Table 3 provides strong support for Hypothesis (2) on the advisory role of 
foreign VC firms.  
Regressions (2a) and (2b) in Table 3, which adjust for the potential endogeneity of the 
foreignness of the VC syndicate, indicate that the foreignness of the VC syndicate is positively 
and significantly related to the IVs, Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin (p=5%) and Pre-existing 
Foreign VC-VC Syndicate Relationship dummy (p=1%). The foreignness of the VC syndicate 
also increases with the proportion of foreign sales (p=1%), suggesting that foreign VC firms 
are associated with IPO companies with foreign business activities.  
Regressions (3a) and (3b) suggest that the proportion of foreign sales is positively and 
significantly related to the IV, Foreign CEO dummy (p=1%). The proportion of foreign sales 
                                                          
9 There is evidence in Table 3 of a negative effect of foreign VC firms on the IPO premium, suggesting that foreign 
VC firms may suffer from liability of foreignness, which in turn affects the value of their portfolio firms at the 
IPO. 
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also increases with each of the two measures of foreign VC presence (p=1%).10 The proportion 
of foreign sales is also greater for larger companies (p=5%), for older ones (p=5% or better), 
as well as for those where the parent company of any of the foreign VC firms operates in the 
same industry as the IPO company (p=10%). Finally, the proportion of foreign sales is 
negatively related to foreign VC reputation (p=1%).    
As to the control variables, the IPO premium increases with company size (p=1%), the hi-tech 
dummy (p=1%), a NASDAQ listing (p=1%), and during the bubble period (p=1%). In addition, 
the IPO premium is lower for more mature IPO companies (p=5%), and those IPOs completed 
following positive market returns (p=1%). Finally, the foreignness of the VC syndicate is 
greater for more reputable foreign VC firms (p=1%), and for those where the parent firms of 
the foreign VC firms operate in the same industry as the IPO company (p=5% or better), but it 
is lower for more mature IPO companies (p=5% or better).11 
4.3. Foreign VC firm origin, foreign business activities, and the IPO premium 
Table 4 tests the validity of Hypothesis (3) on the monitoring role of foreign VC firms. It 
investigates whether the fact that the IPO company has at least one VC firm in the VC syndicate 
originating from the same country where it has foreign business activities increases the positive 
impact on the IPO premium of the interaction between foreign business activities and the 
foreignness of the VC syndicate. It does so via a subsample analysis, with the first subsample 
containing the IPO companies with foreign business activities in at least one the VC countries 
of origin (regressions (4a), (5a), and (6a) as well as regressions (7c), (8c), and (9c)) and the 
                                                          
10 As expected, the effect of foreign VC presence on foreign business activities is economically greater than that 
of domestic VC presence. See regression (3b). 
11 As a robustness check, we measure foreign VC reputation by the number of IPOs per foreign VC firm rather 
than by the total number of previous US IPOs with which all VC firms were involved during the five years prior 
to the IPO. Our results remain consistent. 
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second subsample containing the remaining IPO companies (regressions (4b), (5b), and (6b) as 
well as regressions (7d), (8d), and (9d)). 
Overall, regressions (4a), (4b), (7c), and (7d) in Table 4 suggest that the positive effect on the 
IPO premium of the interaction between foreign business activities and foreign VC presence is 
greater if foreign business activities occur in the same country as the country of origin of at 
least one of the foreign VC firms. The coefficient on the interaction term between foreign VC 
presence and foreign business activities is significantly greater (p=5%) for the subsample of 
IPO companies with foreign business activities in at least one the VC countries of origin. A 
10% increase in the interaction term increases the IPO premium by an additional 7.44 
(=1.419-0.675) to 12.37 (=1.967-0.730) percentage points. This supports Hypothesis (3). 
Expanding foreign VC locations to neighboring countries, i.e. countries with common borders, 
rather than just the VC firm’s country of origin (e.g. a British VC firm is close to Ireland where 
the IPO firm has foreign business activities) yields consistent, yet slightly less significant 
results. The results for the control variables are consistent with those from Table 3.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
5. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS 
5.1. Measuring IPO value by IPO underpricing 
Prior research examines the effects of VC firms on IPO underpricing, a measure for short-term 
performance, defined as the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and 
the offer price expressed as a fraction of the latter. In untabulated robustness tests, we use 
underpricing (more precisely, the natural logarithm of underpricing, Ln (1+ Underpricing), due 
to skewness). Average underpricing for the sample is equal to 25.42%, and the median is 9.1%. 
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We expect underpricing to be lower for foreign VC-backed IPO companies with foreign 
business activities, and we find evidence of this. 
5.2. Geographic diversification rather than foreign business activities 
So far, we have focused on the existence and magnitude of foreign business activities. 
However, what may matter is the degree of geographic diversification rather than the intensity 
of foreign business activities. For example, an IPO company may have lots of foreign business 
activities, all concentrated in one single country, which would likely increase — rather than 
reduce — risk and uncertainty. Geographic diversification is typically measured by the number 
of countries where the company has foreign business activities (Hitt et al., 2006). In line with 
Hypothesis (2), we expect foreign VC firms to play an advisory role in IPO companies with 
geographically diversified foreign business activities, which positively affects IPO value.  
Not tabulated in the paper, the average IPO company in the sample of 1,086 VC-backed IPOs 
has foreign business activities in 1.92 different foreign locations and the average IPO company 
in the subsample of 314 foreign VC-backed IPOs has such activities in 2.19 different foreign 
locations. The results, which are not tabulated, suggest that the IPO premium is positively 
related to the interaction between geographic diversification and foreign VC presence (p=10% 
or better). Specifically, for a 10% increase in the interaction between geographic diversification 
and Foreign VC Presence, the IPO premium is 0.28 to 0.96 percentage points higher. This 
confirms Hypothesis (2) on the advisory role of foreign VC firms in supporting the 
internationalization of their portfolio companies. 
5.3. Foreign VC distance 
In Section 2.2, we argued that, through their presence, foreign VC firms may play an advisory 
role in their IPO companies engaged in foreign business activities. Investors may thus be 
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willing to pay a greater premium for IPO companies with foreign business activities that have 
foreign VC backing. Still, foreign VC firms may have a positive effect on IPO value because 
of their access to distant markets rather than their presence. Chemmanur et al. (2016) posit that 
geographically distant foreign VC firms may potentially possess strengths that benefit their 
portfolio companies and that their domestic VC counterparts lack. For example, the advice 
provided by distant foreign VC firms may provide access to resources, such as untapped growth 
potential in foreign markets, which would otherwise not be available (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). Nahata et al. (2014) show that cultural distance is positively associated with foreign VC 
success and portfolio company performance. 
We use two proxies for distance: (1) Foreign VC Geographic Distance, i.e. the average 
distance, in miles, between the headquarters of the IPO company and the headquarters of each 
of its foreign VC firms, and (2) Foreign VC Cultural Distance, which measures the average 
cultural difference between each foreign VC firm’s country of origin and the IPO company’s 
home country, i.e. the USA. In line with Dai et al. (2012), we calculate Foreign VC Cultural 
Distance using the most up-to-date version (2010) of Hofstede’s (2001) six dimensions of 
national culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, individualism, long/short 
term orientation, and indulgence versus restraints. Similar to Kogut & Singh (1988), the 
cultural distance between a given foreign VC firm’s country of origin j and the USA (US), the 
home country of all of the IPO sample companies, is computed as follows: 
𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 = ∑
(𝐼𝑖𝑗 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑈𝑆)/𝑉𝑖
6
6
𝑖=1
 
where i refers to the above six dimensions of national culture, Iij represents Hofstede’s index 
for cultural dimension i and country j, and Vi represents the variance of the index across 
dimension i. Cultural distance is the average of the cultural distances between the country of 
origin of each foreign VC firm and the USA. The validity of Hypothesis (2) is tested using the 
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interaction between the foreign VC distance and foreign business activities. Again, we expect 
the coefficient on this interaction term to be positive. We find consistent evidence of this. 
5.4. Extended sample  
We repeat the tests for the validity of our three hypotheses by extending our sample of VC-
backed IPO companies by including all non-VC-backed IPO companies with data available on 
IPO company and CEO characteristics. The extended sample contains 2,147 IPOs, including 
our sample of 1,086 VC-backed IPOs as well as the additional 1,061 non-VC-backed IPOs. 
The findings, which are not tabulated, are consistent with those for the sample of VC-backed 
IPO companies.  
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
While a large body of literature focuses on US VC firms that invest in IPO companies based 
outside the USA, little is known about the roles played by foreign VC firms investing in US 
IPO companies. This paper investigates whether foreign VC firms certify the quality of foreign 
business activities of US IPO companies, and whether they enhance these activities via their 
advisory and monitoring roles. Our paper does not find any evidence of a direct positive effect 
of foreign VC firms on the IPO premium. However, there is strong and consistent evidence of 
such indirect positive effects. These effects stem from the three distinct roles that foreign VC 
firms play. The roles are the certification role, the advisory role, and the monitoring role.  
Concerning the first role, a VC syndicate of both foreign and domestic VC firms may be better 
at certifying the quality of the portfolio company than a VC syndicate consisting solely of 
foreign or domestic VC firms (Karsai et al., 1998). We contribute to this literature by showing 
that a VC syndicate with both foreign and domestic VC firms leads to a higher IPO premium.  
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Concerning the second role, foreign VC firms provide access to knowledge about foreign 
markets and access to social capital in these markets (Mäkelä & Maula, 2006). While it is 
difficult to measure the quality of advice provided by VC firms, we nevertheless contribute to 
this literature by showing that foreign VC firms play an advisory role that enhances the foreign 
business activities of their portfolio companies, which is reflected in a higher IPO premium. 
Hence, our paper contributes to the existing literature, which is as yet divided about the effects 
of foreign business activities on new ventures. For example, while Zahra et al. (2000) highlight 
the advantages of foreign business activities, LiPuma (2012) argues that such activities may 
expose new ventures to more varying political, economic, social, and technological 
environments. Our research suggests that foreign VC firms provide the necessary advice to 
ensure the benefits of foreign business activities outweigh their costs. 
Finally, concerning the third role, we argue that the proximity of foreign VC firms to the foreign 
business activities of their portfolio companies reduces the monitoring costs of these activities. 
Foreign VC firms are able to visit the foreign plants, read the business reports and review 
operations without significant costs and loss of time, resulting in greater monitoring. Such 
closer and easier control ultimately reduces agency costs. We extend the literature on the 
monitoring role of foreign VC firms, and provide further clarification about the conditions 
under which foreign business activities create value in US IPO companies. Specifically, we 
find that the positive effect of the interaction between foreign VC presence and foreign business 
activities on the IPO premium is greater when the foreign VC firms are from the same countries 
where the IPO company has foreign business activities.  
However, our research may suffer from at least five limitations. A first limitation relates to the 
above-mentioned three roles of foreign VC firms. To test the hypothesized effects of these 
three roles we require measures for certification, the provision of advice, and monitoring. 
However, there are no such direct measures. A second limitation refers to the fact that prior 
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literature suggests that the value and success of portfolio companies are differentially affected 
by the type of VC firm, and that different types of VC firms have different investment strategies 
(Tykvova & Walz, 2007). For example, corporate VC firms have financial and strategic goals, 
and use their industry experience to support the success and performance of their portfolio 
companies (Maula et al., 2005). Preliminary analysis suggests that, compared to other foreign 
VC firms, foreign corporate VC firms provide better advice to their IPO companies about their 
foreign business activities. Still, there is a need for a more thorough and detailed analysis, 
which we leave for future research. A third limitation relates to our treatment of risk factors. 
Our empirical results do not suggest any significant association between the number of risk 
factors and the IPO premium. However, risk factors could be classified into different categories 
(e.g. managerial, legal, technological, international, and financial issues), as they may not all 
have the same impact on IPO performance. A fourth limitation of our study pertains to the fact 
that our data does not permit us to identify what occurred first, i.e. the foreign VC backing or 
the foreign business activities. While our simultaneous system of equations, somewhat 
mitigates this concern, future research being able to determine the exact timing of foreign 
business activities relative to foreign VC investment would further our understanding of the 
role of foreign VC firms. Finally, as our study focuses on US IPO companies it needs to be 
seen whether our results are generalizable to other, possibly very different institutional 
contexts. 
Our findings are important for entrepreneurs, US IPO companies, and US and foreign VC 
firms, as well as investors, policy makers and scholars interested in the effects of foreign VC 
firms on their US portfolio companies. Indeed, our research suggests that US IPO companies 
with foreign business activities benefit from foreign VC firms in their VC syndicate. Our 
findings also suggest that entrepreneurs should seek funding and support from foreign VC 
firms, in particular those located in their company’s (potential) foreign markets, to benefit from 
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the kind of support that cannot be provided by domestic VC firms. Given their advisory and 
monitoring roles, foreign VC firms might be “sought after” partners by domestic US VC firms 
and US companies that are looking to develop their foreign business activities. 
Nevertheless, our research does not suggest that foreign VC firms act as substitutes for 
domestic VC firms as we find that IPO companies benefit from VC syndicates including both 
foreign and domestic VC firms. This implies that both foreign and domestic VC firms play 
important, but distinct roles: There is a division of labor whereby foreign VC firms support 
foreign business activities, whereas domestic VC firms provide knowledge of the US market 
and support local business activities. This study extends our understanding of the role of foreign 
VC firms in US IPOs. It also calls for future research on the nature of their involvement in 
entrepreneurial companies, including their involvement in the governance of such companies. 
For example, future research may focus on the board representation of foreign VC firms and 
other potential channels through which they may exert their influence. Future research may 
also examine the validity of our findings for countries with different institutional environments 
and varying levels of entrepreneurial opportunities.   
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Appendix – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
IPO Premium 
 
The difference between the offer price and the pre-IPO book value per share expressed as a 
fraction of the offer price 
IPO Company Characteristics 
 
Proportion Foreign Sales  The IPO company’s ratio of sales generated outside the US to the firm’s total sales in the 
fiscal year prior to the IPO 
Proportion Foreign Assets  The IPO company’s ratio of assets owned outside the US to the firm’s total assets in the 
fiscal year prior to the IPO 
Proportion Foreign Income  
 
The IPO company’s ratio of income generated outside the US to the firm’s total income in 
the fiscal year prior to the IPO 
Foreign CEO dummy  Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO of the IPO company at the time of IPO is not born in the USA, 
and 0 otherwise 
Market Capitalization  The total number of shares outstanding immediately after the IPO times the offer price 
Hi-tech dummy  
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company is a hi-tech firm as defined by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), and 0 otherwise. Hi-tech companies are those with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 
3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 
4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), 7371, 7372, 7373, 
7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
Company Age  The difference, in years, between the IPO date and the company’s incorporation date 
Number of Risk Factors  The number of risk factors stipulated in the IPO prospectus 
Lock-up Period  The difference, in days, between the IPO date and the end of the lock-up period date 
Underwriter Reputation  The underwriter reputation score based on the ranking in Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Bubble Period dummy Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO occurs in 1999-2000, and 0 otherwise 
Market Return  
 
The weighted average of the daily return of the CRSP equally weighted portfolio over the 
3-month period preceding the IPO date 
NASDAQ dummy Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company is listed on NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise 
Loss dummy Y–1 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company has a negative ROA in year –1 prior to the IPO, and 
0 otherwise 
Loss dummy Y–2 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO comp has a negative ROA in year –2 prior to the IPO, and 0 
otherwise 
Founder CEO  
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company’s CEO is a founder of the company, and 0 otherwise 
Equity Offer Ratio The number of shares issued at the IPO to the total number of shares outstanding 
immediately after the IPO 
VC Characteristics 
 
VC Syndicate  The number of VC firms investing in the IPO company immediately prior to the offering 
Proportion of Foreign 
(Domestic) VC 
The number of foreign (domestic) VC firms divided by the total number of VC firms within 
the VC syndicate 
Foreign (Domestic) VC 
Ownership 
The number of shares owned by foreign (domestic) VC firms divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding, both measured immediately prior to the IPO. 
Foreign and Domestic VC 
dummy 
Dummy equal to 1 if the VC syndicate of the IPO company involves both domestic and 
foreign VCs, and 0 otherwise 
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Foreign (Domestic) VC 
Reputation 
The total number of previous US IPOs with which all of the IPO company’s foreign 
(domestic) VC firms were involved during the five years prior to the IPO 
Same VC-Foreign Business 
Country 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company has foreign business activities in at least one of the 
VC countries of origin, and 0 otherwise 
Different VC-Foreign Business 
Country 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company has no foreign business activities in any of the VC 
countries of origin, and 0 otherwise 
Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin  
 
Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC 
Syndicate Relationship dummy 
Dummy equal to 1 if the IPO company’s CEO is from the same country as at least one of 
the VC firms, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy equal to 1 if any of the foreign VC firms has co-invested in a prior IPO company 
since 1987 with any other member of the VC syndicate, and 0 otherwise 
Same Foreign CVC-IPO 
Company Industry 
 
Number of Foreign Subsidiaries 
Dummy equal to 1 if the VC syndicate includes a foreign corporate VC firm, whose parent 
company operates in the same industry as the IPO company, based on the one-digit SIC, and 
zero otherwise 
The number of countries where the IPO company has at least one foreign subsidiary, as 
listed in the IPO prospectus 
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Figure 1 – Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H(1): Certification 
+ 
H(2): Advice 
+ 
H(3): Monitoring 
+ 
Foreign VC presence  
Foreign & domestic 
VC syndicate  
Foreign VC presence in same 
country as foreign business 
activities 
IPO premium  Foreign business activities  
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median S.d.            
Panel A – IPO Company Characteristics: Sample of VC-backed IPOs (N = 1,086)   
IPO Premium 0.734 0.744 0.188   
Proportion Foreign Sales 0.110 0.000 0.209   
Market Capitalization (in $mil.) 437.296 243.107 938.333   
Hi-tech dummy 0.791 1.000 0.407   
Company Age 9.649 6.206 12.598   
Number of Risk Factors 30.150 30.000 10.023   
Lockup Period 170.037 180.000 50.118   
Underwriter Reputation 8.202 9.000 1.287   
Bubble Period dummy 0.395 0.000 0.489   
Market Return 0.008 0.002 0.020   
NASDAQ dummy 0.904 1.000 0.294   
Loss dummy Y–1 0.641 1.000 0.480   
Loss dummy Y–2 0.656 1.000 0.475   
Equity Offer ratio 0.356 0.287 0.217   
Founder CEO 0.378 0.000 0.485   
Foreign CEO dummy 0.250 0.000 0.433   
Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin 0.034 0.000 0.180   
Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC Synd. Relation 0.075 0.000 0.263   
Same Foreign VC-IPO Company Industry 0.037 0.000 0.188        
Panel B – VC Characteristics      
Sample of VC-backed IPOs (N = 1,086) 
VC Syndicate 3.883 3.000 2.845   
Proportion of Foreign VCs 0.098 0.000 0.201   
Proportion of Domestic VCs  0.902 1.000 0.201   
Foreign VC Ownership 0.038 0.000 0.093   
Domestic VC Ownership 0.365 0.342 0.253   
For. & Dom. VC dummy 0.267 0.000 0.443   
Foreign VC Reputation 1.270 0.000 5.980   
Domestic VC Reputation 13.142 7.667 16.767   
Same VC-Foreign Business Country 0.157 0.000 0.364        
Foreign VC-backed Subsample (N = 314) 
VC Syndicate 5.723 5.000 3.456   
Proportion of Foreign VCs 0.337 0.250 0.241   
Proportion of Domestic VCs  0.663 0.750 0.241   
Foreign VC Ownership 0.132 0.098 0.132   
Domestic VC Ownership 0.327 0.309 0.245   
For. & Dom. VC dummy 0.924 1.000 0.266   
Foreign VC Reputation 4.366 1.000 10.506   
Domestic VC Reputation 12.192 8.000 13.953   
Same VC-Foreign Business Country                 0.538          1.000 0.499        
  
36 
 
Table 2 – Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14         15          
1.   IPO Premium     1.00                
2.   For. & Dom. VC dummy    0.19   1.00   
3.   Prop. For. Sales     0.28   0.11   1.00               
4.   Prop. For. VCs     0.27   0.56   0.12   1.00            
5.   For. VC Ownership    0.27   0.57   0.14   0.68   1.00           
6.   Dom. VC Ownership  –0.01 –0.03     0.02 –0.22 –0.08   1.00        
7.   Same VC-For. Bus.Country 0.21   0.44   0.17   0.50   0.41 –0.05   1.00   
8.   For. VC Reputation    0.03   0.31 –0.01   0.27   0.28 –0.06   0.14   1.00 
9.   Dom. VC Reputation    0.01   0.00   0.04 –0.10  –0.05   0.04 –0.02   0.00   1.00 
10. Market Cap. (in $mil.)    0.12   0.03   0.14   0.01   0.03   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.07   1.00   
11. Hi-tech dummy     0.17   0.12   0.01   0.10   0.09 –0.04   0.10   0.06   0.12 –0.09   1.00   
12. Company Age   –0.07 –0.07   0.09 –0.05 –0.05   0.03 –0.04 –0.01 –0.04   0.12 –0.25   1.00  
13. Loss dummy Y–1     0.05   0.09   0.00    0.07   0.08   0.08   0.07 –0.01 –0.01 –0.03   0.17 –0.17   1.00  
14. Loss dummy Y–2     0.11   0.12   0.03   0.11   0.10   0.05   0.08 –0.01   0.02 –0.03   0.20 –0.18   0.80    1.00 
15. Number of Risk Factors    0.15   0.16   0.15   0.11   0.13   0.23   0.13   0.01   0.17   0.14   0.06 –0.09   0.13    0.15   1.00 
16. Equity Offer ratio   –0.15 –0.08 –0.14 –0.10 –0.05 –0.02 –0.06   0.03   0.03 –0.18 –0.02 –0.04 –0.08 –0.09 –0.21 
17. Founder CEO     0.03   0.01   0.03   0.00 –0.02 –0.07   0.03 –0.04   0.00   0.00   0.01 –0.15   0.02    0.06 –0.01 
18. VC Syndicate     0.08   0.47   0.06   0.10   0.18   0.16   0.34   0.13   0.00   0.00   0.15 –0.12   0.11    0.15   0.19 
19. Same For. VC-IPO Industry–0.04   0.25   0.21   0.35   0.29 –0.12   0.27   0.01   0.00   0.02   0.09 –0.02   0.03    0.08   0.02 
20. NASDAQ dummy      0.06   0.08 –0.10   0.06   0.04 –0.14   0.06   0.03 –0.02 –0.17   0.30 –0.17   0.09    0.10 –0.02 
21. Lockup Period     0.00 –0.02 –0.01   0.01   0.02   0.09 –0.03 –0.02 –0.08 –0.12   0.04 –0.08   0.01   0.01   0.05 
22. Underwriter Reputation    0.14   0.09   0.09   0.06   0.07   0.12   0.10   0.03   0.09   0.15   0.00   0.02   0.09    0.10   0.10 
23. Bubble Period dummy    0.10   0.00  –0.09   0.02 –0.04 –0.01 –0.04 –0.03   0.06   0.00   0.21 –0.19   0.28    0.27 –0.02 
24. Market Return   –0.12   0.01   0.07 –0.04 –0.03 –0.09   0.01   0.02   0.07 –0.01 –0.12   0.12 –0.07 –0.07 –0.09 
25. Same For.VC-CEO Origin     0.02   0.29   0.04    0.20   0.13 –0.09   0.30   0.15 –0.02   0.00   0.00 –0.02   0.02    0.03   0.07 
26. Pre-exist. For. VC-Syn.Rel.   0.03   0.45   0.01   0.28   0.29 –0.04   0.31   0.21   0.01   0.07   0.03 –0.03   0.07   0.08   0.09 
27. For. CEO dummy     0.03   0.15   0.21   0.05   0.04 –0.03   0.11   0.01   0.03   0.08   0.10 –0.03   0.02    0.06   0.09  
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    16  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27                     
16. Equity Offer ratio       1.00    
17. Founder CEO         0.03    1.00 
18. VC Syndicate       –0.05  –0.07    1.00   
19. Same For. CVC-IPO Industry  –0.02  –0.03   0.17   1.00   
20. NASDAQ dummy         0.02    0.07   0.05   0.01   1.00 
21. Lockup Period       0.06  –0.07 –0.02   0.01   0.04  1.00 
22. Underwriter Reputation      –0.09    0.11 –0.05   0.04   0.03 –0.18   1.00 
23. Bubble Period dummy      –0.06  –0.04   0.18 –0.01   0.04 –0.02   0.14   1.00 
24. Market Return       –0.04    0.09 –0.14   0.01 –0.03 –0.14 –0.01 –0.15  1.00 
25. Same For.VC-CEO Origin      –0.03    0.32 –0.02   0.15   0.06 –0.07   0.07 –0.11  0.19  1.00 
26. Pre-exist. For. VC-Syn. Rel.   –0.05    0.31   0.03   0.07   0.00 –0.04   0.03   0.00  0.03  0.25  1.00 
27. For. CEO dummy       –0.08    0.04   0.04   0.14   0.00 –0.00   0.05   0.02  0.02  0.08  0.02  1.00      
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients were used for continuous variables, point biserial correlation coefficients were used for dichotomous variables. Correlation coefficients 
greater than .058 (.079) or less than –.058 (–.079) are significant at the 5% (1%) level and above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
Table 3 – IPO Premium, Foreign VC, and Foreign Business Activities Using the Sample of VC-backed IPO Companies: A 3SLS Model 
                 IPO                 Prop.               Prop.For.                 IPO                For. VC           Prop. For.   
                          Premium         For. VCs              Sales                  Premium          Ownership           Sales                          
   (1a) (2a)    (3a)          (1b)       (2b)                 (3b)        
Constant   0.453* 0.151  0.374  0.357 -0.013 -0.221   
   0.237 0.242  0.231  0.290 0.136  0.219    
Main explanatory variables 
Foreign & Domestic VC dummy   0.137**     0.110**     
   0.065    0.054     
Proportion Foreign Sales   0.808** 1.175***   0.862*** 0.607***    
   0.317 0.040    0.198 0.024    
Foreign VC Presence           -0.782**   0.818*** -1.686**   1.585***  
   0.350   0.031  0.685   0.063     
Foreign VC Presence x Proportion Foreign Sales  0.864**    1.301***     
   0.423    0.506     
Domestic VC Presence      -0.105*** -0.047***  0.077***  
       0.028 0.016  0.027  
Same VC Foreign Bus. Country   0.015   0.006  0.008   0.005  
   0.031   0.015  0.026   0.013   
Foreign VC Reputation   0.005***  0.009*** -0.007***  0.002**  0.004*** -0.006***    
   0.002  0.001  0.001   0.001  0.001  0.001     
Domestic VC Reputation                    -0.001*  0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*  0.000* -0.000  
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
 
Instrumental variables 
Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin      0.015**    0.011**       
     0.007    0.005   
Pre-existing Foreign VC-VC Syndicate Relationship dummy   0.028***    0.010***   
       0.010    0.003   
Foreign CEO dummy      0.039***    0.045***  
      0.009    0.011   
Control variables 
LnMarket Capitalization    0.028*** -0.012*  0.014**   0.028*** -0.003  0.013**  
    0.009  0.007  0.006   0.007 0.004  0.006  
Hi-tech dummy    0.072***  0.023 -0.018   0.067*** 0.014 -0.023   
    0.020  0.023  0.020  0.018 0.012  0.020  
LnCompany Age   -0.020** -0.022**  0.019** -0.019** -0.014***  0.023***  
    0.010  0.010  0.009   0.009 0.005  0.008  
Loss dummy Y-1    0.040* -0.004  0.003   0.040* 0.017 -0.028   
    0.022  0.025  0.022   0.020 0.013  0.021  
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Loss dummy Y-2    0.046**  0.027 -0.021   0.040** -0.006  0.009  
    0.022  0.026  0.023   0.020 0.013  0.022  
Number of Risk Factors    0.000     0.000    
    0.001     0.001    
Equity Offer ratio   -0.047*   -0.047*    
    0.026     0.028     
Founder CEO   -0.021* -0.024*  0.017 -0.023* -0.016**  0.026**  
    0.013  0.014  0.013   0.013 0.008  0.013  
VC Syndicate   -0.004  0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.003* -0.005*  
    0.006  0.003  0.002   0.003 0.001  0.002  
Same Foreign CVC-IPO Company Industry    0.150***  0.057*  0.040**  0.058*  
        0.037  0.035  0.019  0.032  
NASDAQ dummy    0.072***    0.063***    
    0.025    0.023    
Lockup Period    0.000    0.000    
    0.000    0.000    
Underwriter Reputation    0.002    0.002    
    0.005    0.005    
Bubble Period dummy    0.648***    0.641***    
    0.245    0.193    
Market Return   -0.854***   -0.834***    
    0.290    0.287    
Industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
N   1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086  
Chi2   16416.41 1037.37 1054.30 15385.85 861.90 971.69  
Prob.   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Hansen-Sargan overidentification statistic   6.611   3.583  
Prob.    0.159   0.472    
Standard errors in italic. ***, **, *: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4 – IPO Premium, Foreign VC, and Foreign Business Activities Comparing the Subsamples of VC-backed IPO Companies 
with Same VC-Foreign Business Country vs Different VC-Foreign Business Country: A 3SLS Model 
 
 Same VC-For.Bus. Country           Diff. VC-Foreign Bus. Country       Same VC-For.Bus. Country             Diff. VC-Foreign Bus. Country  
        IPO             Prop.     Prop. For.       IPO             Prop.      Prop. For.         IPO           For. VC     Prop. For.       IPO        For. VC       Prop. For.     
        Premium     For. VCs     Sales         Premium     For. VCs       Sales         Premium     Ownership     Sales        Premium   Ownership      Sales                   
   (4a)     (5a)    (6a)      (4b)      (5b)        (6b)                (7c)             (8c)             (9c)           (7d)             (8d)  (9d)  
Constant 4.490** 0.054 0.367** 3.343** 0.038 0.273 0.578* -0.019 -0.174 0.320 -0.016 -0.233  
 1.888 0.134 0.167 1.404 0.244 0.206 0.343 0.095 0.155 0.245 0.088 0.208  
Foreign & Domestic VC dummy 0.188***   0.056*   0.398***   0.060* 
 0.054   0.029   0.135   0.033    
Proportion Foreign Sales 2.140* 0.624***  0.473* 1.236***  1.513*** 0.479***  0.424** 0.509***   
 1.206 0.071  0.277 0.074  0.513 0.024  0.212 0.037   
Foreign VC Presence -3.152**  0.838*** -0.194  0.694*** -2.027**  2.085*** -0.990*  1.401*** 
 1.392  0.111 0.339  0.040 2.477  0.102 0.506  0.110  
Foreign VC Presence 1.419*** c1   0.675* c1   1.967*** c2   0.730* c2  
 x Proportion Foreign Sales 0.199   0.401   0.551   0.436    
Domestic VC Presence       0.070 -0.022 0.045 -0.026 -0.032** 0.059**  
       0.138 0.045 0.094 0.025 0.013 0.026  
Foreign VC Reputation 0.002 0.009*** -0.003* 0.001 0.009*** -0.007*** 0.003** 0.002* -0.003 0.002 0.005***  -0.008*** 
 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002  
Domestic VC Reputation -0.003 -0.003** 0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000*** 0.001*  
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Same Foreign VC-CEO Origin  0.061*   0.012  0.011**   0.009   
  0.033   0.024  0.005   0.006   
Former Foreign Corp. VC -VC Syndicate 0.017*   0.041***   0.005*   0.062***   
Relationship dummy  0.009   0.012   0.003   0.011   
Foreign CEO   0.036*   0.035**   0.033***   0.043*** 
   0.019   0.017   0.012   0.010  
Same Foreign VC-IPO Company Industry 0.132*** 0.064*  0.108*** 0.052*  0.024 0.048  0.088*** 0.068*  
  0.040 0.038  0.032 0.031  0.020 0.043  0.024 0.038  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 170 170 170 916 916 916 170 170 170 916 916 916  
Chi2 124.850 710.820 328.120 20113.190 383.630 526.470 1183.300 694.870 662.070 19961.110 501.280 404.660  
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
The superscripts c1 and c2 identify the pairs of coefficients with a significant Z-test statistic with the difference in the two coefficients significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors in italic. ***, **, *: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
